加快完善机制建设 提升债市发展质效（附英文版）

　　新发展阶段对债券市场服务实体经济、防范化解金融风险、支持金融改革开放提出了更高要求，债券市场需要进一步提升市场效率，促进融资投资、资源配置、价格发现、政策传导等市场功能充分发挥。本文从市场效率视角对我国债券市场在发行、交易、登记托管、信息披露、行业标准建设等方面的实践经验与存在的问题进行分析，并提出制度与技术层面的优化建议。

　　关键词

　　市场效率  中央登记托管机制  标准化

　　中国债券市场已发展成为全球第二大债券市场，成为全球金融市场的重要一极。我国债券市场机制在部分领域已达到国际先进水平，如透明高效的中央登记托管体系、确定性最强的券款对付（DVP）结算机制、日益成熟的中国债券收益率曲线等。在步入高质量发展新阶段后，为更好地服务实体经济发展和金融改革开放，债券市场需要充分发挥融资投资、资源配置、价格发现、政策传导等功能。市场功能的发挥依赖于高效运行。未来应传承宝贵历史经验，破解现存障碍问题，从发行、交易、登记托管、信息披露、行业标准建设等维度创新优化债券市场机制，推动市场效率再上台阶，以高效运行促进高质量发展。

　　债券市场需要迈向更高质效

　　自1981年国债恢复发行以来，经过40多年的发展探索，我国债券市场取得了巨大成就。金融基础设施建设不断加强，债券品种不断丰富，市场参与主体更加多元，规模持续增长，交易结算日趋活跃，流动性不断提高，对外开放不断加快。

　　随着国民经济快速发展、外部环境深刻变化、金融改革开放持续推进，新发展阶段对债券市场服务实体经济、防范化解金融风险、支持金融改革开放提出了更高要求。债券市场需要更加充分地发挥融资投资、资源配置、价格发现、政策传导等功能。金融市场功能的实现程度依赖于市场效率，效率越高，功能越能充分发挥。因此，立足新发展阶段，适应新机遇、新要求，债券市场发展要在拓展规模的同时，努力挖掘深度，切实提质增效，市场效率应成为新阶段的发展方向和机制优化的着力点。

　　一般来说，一个高效率的债券市场应具备如下特征：一是运行快捷稳健，即债券的发行交易能够以最短时间、最低成本，安全、及时、有效地达成，市场具备活力和流动性，基础设施高效强健；二是信息披露透明，即债券信息能够及时、完整、准确地对外披露，并通过数字化的载体或格式便利市场主体操作；三是标准化治理，即债券业务有统一的监管规范和完备的行业标准指引，市场环境公平公正；四是价格传导通畅，即债券价格的变化能够及时充分反映宏观经济形势变化，引导金融资源配置。

　　为此，可基于上述维度，总结传承我国债券市场的宝贵实践经验，着力解决现存问题和障碍，促进市场更加高效安全运行。

　　我国债券市场效率提升的实践成就

　　得益于制度体系的不断完善以及金融基础设施的强力支持，我国债券市场建设取得了令人瞩目的成就，多项安排全球领先，债券市场效率显著提升。

　　（一）金融基础设施支持市场高效稳健运行

　　一是DVP结算机制保障债券结算交易安全高效。2004年，中央结算公司中央债券综合业务系统与央行大额支付系统互联对接，建成全额实时的DVP结算机制。目前，银行间债券市场二级市场已全面实现使用央行货币的DVP结算机制，消除了债券交易中的结算本金风险，同时通过债券自动质押融资等机制为支付系统的稳定高效运行提供有力保障。这是中国金融基础设施达到国际先进水平的主要标志之一。

　　二是中央登记托管制度夯实债市高效运行的基础。中央登记托管是指中央托管机构（CSD）依据法律或中央政府部门授权，同时履行对债券的中央登记和中央托管职能，实现债券中央登记和中央托管的一体化，使得债券权益的转移、维护和管理仅通过中央登记托管机构的账户体系即可完成，债券交收和变更登记同时发生，具有法律关系清晰、穿透性强的特点，能够有效提升交易结算的安全性和效率。中国债券市场曾因分散托管和缺乏统一登记而经历曲折发展阶段。为扭转混乱局面，在充分结合国际经验和国内现实的基础上，中国债券市场于20世纪90年代建立了中央登记托管制度，成为市场20多年来高效稳健运行的重要基石和基本保障。基于中央登记托管制度构建的全球通一级账户模式安全、高效、透明，成为境外投资者进入中国债券市场的主渠道，全球通下境外机构持债量占境外机构持债总量的75%。

　　目前中国债券市场的结算周期已较很多发达国家的债券市场更短，境内结算实现以T+0为主、T+1为辅，并为跨境结算提供非标准化的灵活结算周期安排（T+N）。其中，全球通直接入市模式的结算周期主要集中在T+1，T+0、T+1结算的合计占比超过60%；而在多级托管、间接入市的香港债券通模式下，结算周期明显拉长，T+0、T+1合计占比约为38%，其中T+0仅占0.57%。

　　（二）信息披露机制建设不断完善

　　一是公司信用类债券信息披露制度趋于统一。2020年12月，人民银行、国家发展改革委、证监会联合发布《公司信用类债券信息披露管理办法》，统一了两大信用债市场的信息披露制度，改善了此前不同券种信息披露要求不同的问题。2021年8月，人民银行、国家发展改革委、财政部、银保监会、证监会和外汇局联合发布《关于推动公司信用类债券市场改革开放高质量发展的指导意见》，提出分类趋同的原则，按照公开发行和非公开发行的分类标准逐步统一同类公司信用债相关规则，明确提出“着重对非公开发行公司信用类债券的发行转让、信息披露、投资者保护、法律责任等进行统一规范”。

　　二是绿色债券环境效益披露取得突破。近年来，我国绿色债券市场蓬勃发展，成为推动绿色发展与低碳转型的重要途径。为促进绿色债券环境效益信息披露，中央结算公司发布“绿色债券环境效益信息披露指标体系”，引起市场广泛关注，拟被深圳市地方金融监督管理局纳入深圳市绿色金融指标体系的地区标准。中央结算公司已上线绿色债券环境效益信息披露门户和绿色债券数据库，可供用户查询、下载绿色债券环境效益信息数据、中债绿色债券指数和绿色债券相关政策要闻、研究成果。运用数字化技术构建统一的绿色债券环境效益信息披露平台和数据库，能够较全面系统地量化债券募集资金对环境的贡献，有助于督促发行人提高信息披露透明度、防止“漂绿”等行为，帮助投资人降低甄别成本、提升投资效率，帮助政府部门更好地识别绿色债券、评估政策效果。

　　三是环境、社会和公司治理（ESG）评价体系积极推进。践行可持续发展理念已成为全球普遍共识，ESG评价作为关注企业可持续经营能力的价值理念和评价标准，受到国内外投资者的广泛关注，并在中国债券市场逐渐兴起。随着碳达峰、碳中和政策出台，国内对ESG理念及其相关产品的关注度和需求与日俱增。中央结算公司结合国际主流框架方法，深度融合中国国情与市场特点，自主研发“中债ESG评价体系”，通过金融科技手段集成大量非结构化数据和另类数据，对债券发行主体的ESG信息进行全面采集分析，成为首家实现中国债券市场公募信用债发行主体全覆盖的ESG评价体系，涵盖债券市场及上市公司主体共计8000余家。中债ESG评价指标由环境绩效（E）、社会责任（S）、公司治理（G）三项汇总而成，共包含二级指标14个，三级指标39个，底层计算指标160余个。中债ESG评价体系的推出，填补了国内债券市场ESG评价的空白，为引导和完善中国债券市场ESG评价体系与标准形成、引导企业可持续发展、提升ESG信息披露质量、保护债券投资者利益、推进债券市场ESG实践与应用发展发挥了重要作用。

　　（三）两项债券价格指标产品的行业标准发布

　　在成熟的债券市场，统一精细的监管标准和业务规则是市场高效运行的重要基础。在我国债券市场多头监管格局下，推动市场重要业务规则标准化不但可以规范市场运行，提高市场效率，而且更有助于减少人治因素，提升监管效能。中央结算公司基于20余年金融基础设施发展实践，构建了债券登记、估值、担保品等领域的10余项标准。其中，“债券价格指标产品描述规范”和“债券价格指标产品数据采集规范”已通过全国金融标准化技术委员会审查，作为行业标准由中国人民银行在2021年7月正式发布，首次对债券价格指标产品的数据源采集和产品发布两个重要环节进行了统一规范。两项行业标准的发布有效提高了债券价格指标产品的基准性、公允性和产品质量，降低了定价系统建设成本，促进了债券市场数据共享。

　　（四）债券收益率曲线体系日趋完善

　　国债收益率曲线对货币政策响应迅速，是一国无风险利率的代表，是金融市场重要的定价分析和风险管理计量基准。党的十八届三中全会提出“健全反映市场供求关系的国债收益率曲线”，2020年中共中央、国务院发布的《关于构建更加完善的要素市场化配置体制机制的意见》和《关于新时代加快完善社会主义市场经济体制的意见》中均进一步提出“更好发挥国债收益率曲线定价基准作用”的要求。

　　自1999年中央结算公司发布第一条人民币国债收益率曲线以来，中国国债收益率曲线的编制发布日趋成熟。自2014年起，财政部、人民银行、银保监会陆续在其网站发布中央结算公司编制的国债收益率曲线。国债收益率曲线应用日益广泛，被市场机构广泛用于公允价值计量、交易定价参考和风险管理，在债券市场上发挥着重要作用。记账式国债、地方政府债券在招标发行时采用中债国债收益率曲线作为发行定价基准。2016年，3个月期中债国债收益率被纳入特别提款权（SDR）利率篮子，为境外央行类及商业机构投资中国债券市场提供定价参考，有效推动了人民币纳入SDR货币篮子的国际化进程。国债收益率曲线还被广泛应用于银行理财、信贷资产、信托产品及保险资管产品等非标准化债权类资产定价领域，并在商业银行内部资金转移定价（FTP）过程中发挥越来越重要的作用。

　　目前中债收益率曲线覆盖了中国债券市场所有债券品种和信用级别，政策性金融债和信用债收益率曲线也在支持金融市场发展、畅通货币政策传导方面发挥着积极应用。在政策性金融债收益率曲线方面，国家开发银行、中国农业发展银行和中国进出口银行分别在其网站展示中债国开债收益率曲线、中债农发行债收益率曲线和中债进出口行债收益率曲线，作为政策性金融债一级发行定价、二级市场交易的重要参考；中债国开债收益率曲线成为部分浮动利率债券的基准利率，中债进出口行债收益率曲线被进出口银行作为无固定期限资本债券的基准利率；以中债国开债和农发债收益率曲线为基础计算的国开债和农发债估值成为标准债券远期产品的定价基准。在信用债收益率曲线方面，人民银行和银保监会在其网站发布中债商业银行普通债收益率曲线和中债中短期票据收益率曲线。信用债收益率曲线能够及时、精确反映债券市场的动态变化，可以为观察货币政策向实体经济传导效果、预判宏观经济走势、研究和制定宏观经济政策提供重要参考。

　　债券市场效率仍存提升空间

　　中国债券市场已进入新发展阶段，为全面提升市场效率，一些问题与挑战亟待应对和解决，市场机制需要进一步健全。

　　（一）发行、交易机制有待完善

　　一是发行DVP结算机制尚未全面实现。2001年国际清算银行（BIS）和国际证监会组织（IOSCO）联合发布的《证券结算系统推荐标准》（RSSS）提出“券款对付可以而且应该像用于证券二级市场交易一样，用于证券的发行与兑付”。我国银行间债券市场的交易市场已全面实现DVP结算，但一级市场的发行缴款还未明确规范采用DVP结算，未实现债券确权上市与资金交付同时进行，既影响债券发行效率，也存在一定违约风险。

　　二是国际证券识别编码（ISIN）申请流程较长。ISIN是国际标准化组织制定的证券编码标准。在债券市场，ISIN解决了跨场所债券的唯一识别问题，也是境外投资者识别境内债券的重要手段，对我国债券市场对外开放至关重要。目前我国债券市场ISIN的申请流程较长，大部分债券的ISIN获准日滞后于起息日或上市日。

　　三是私募基金参与债券市场的比重偏低。我国正在统筹多层次债券市场建设，大力发展高收益债等创新工具。这需要培育风险偏好更为多元化的投资者群体，进一步激发市场创新活力。相关数据显示，截至2021年末，在中国证券投资基金业协会备案的存续私募基金管理人共有24610家；而银行间市场本币市场成员中共有私募基金404家，反映私募基金参与债券市场的比重偏低。

　　四是金融机构投资债券存在评级限制。从现行政策要求以及金融机构内部管理机制来看，金融机构投资债券需满足一定评级标准和要求。有关评级要求针对的是个券而不是组合，这在一定程度上影响了市场活力，也可能形成反向激励，导致评级虚高问题。

　　五是银行持债的差异化风险计提规定有待完善。银行业金融机构资产端和负债端的债券规模已超过百万亿元。根据《商业银行资本管理办法（试行）》，商业银行对我国其他金融机构债权和一般企业债权的风险权重均为100%，对我国其他商业银行债权的风险权重为25%，对符合条件的微型和小型企业债权的风险权重为75%，不利于深化对风险的差异化管理。

　　六是回购交易尚未对境外投资者全面放开。回购交易是投资者进行流动性管理的基本工具。对于境外投资者，目前银行间债券回购业务仅允许境外央行类机构以及人民币参加行、清算行参与，事实上注重资金及资产使用效率的境外资管机构更需要开展回购业务。此外，在操作上，目前境外机构参与境内回购业务仍需签署银行间市场交易商协会（NAFMII）发布的回购主协议，未能与国际回购主协议通用，在一定程度上影响业务参与的积极性。

　　七是国债期货市场参与机构数量和类型有限。目前我国国债期货市场参与机构数量和类型有限，仅有五大国有商业银行获批，并受窗口制约。大部分商业银行的利率风险对冲工具仍主要为利率互换、债券远期，缺少标准化工具。此外，国债期货尚未对境外投资者放开，无法满足其开展标准化利率风险对冲的需要。这既影响境外投资者进入中国债券市场的积极性，也导致境外投资者只能通过卖出现货债券来管理风险敞口，带来了一定的跨境资金流动风险。

　　（二）金融基础设施布局需要统筹优化

　　一是不透明的多级托管模式存潜在风险。中央登记托管结算制度设计是汲取我国债券市场发展经验和教训的结果，是监管部门智慧的结晶，是被实践证明有效、兼具安全性与效率的模式，应坚定不移地贯彻落实，但目前仍存在一些模糊认识。比如，有观点认为，理财产品可以实行混同不透明账户的多级托管模式，而这蕴含着严重的系统性风险。此外，在境外投资者通过混同账户间接入市模式下，信息的真实性、完整性、及时性难以充分保证，监管难以有效穿透，也存在一定隐患。

　　二是登记托管机构碎片化。国际上，由统一后台支持多元化前台是通行模式。托管结算机构呈现集中统一趋势，以确保交易前台多而不乱，各国纷纷通过整合托管结算后台达到促进市场要素自由流动、降低交易成本、提高市场效率的目的。同时，为满足复杂多样的交易需求，国际上交易前台呈现服务多元化特征，且数量较多，竞争充分。我国债券市场登记托管结算基础设施曾因治乱而统一，但近年来又出现一定程度的分散化。目前，债券市场3家登记托管结算机构按照券种和市场分别进行登记、托管和结算，造成了重复建设，在此基础上的叠床架屋增加了机构之间的沟通成本，加剧了债券市场分割，降低了安全性和效率。目前大多数国家设置了单一登记结算机构，全世界设有3家登记结算机构的只有中国、印度这两个案例。与此同时，我国债券市场交易前台相对集中，特别是场外市场的前台发育不充分，数量较少，这与国际规律不符，也难以充分满足各类参与者的多层次需求。

　　三是中央托管机构与中央对手方没有完全隔离。债券中央托管机构与中央对手方的风险属性不同，在绝大多数国家是相互独立的法人实体。但国内部分金融基础设施的中央对手方和中央托管机构职能混同，未能实现风险隔离。

　　（三）信息披露标准化、穿透性有待加强

　　一是公司信用类债券需要统一信息披露标准。我国公司信用类债券细分品种多，在银行间市场和交易所都有交易，信息披露标准趋于统一但仍有不一致之处。为减轻市场机构的操作负担，简化内部流程，提高信息披露效率，降低失误率和操作风险，有必要积极推动实现公司信用类债券信息披露标准统一和数据共享。私募债公开披露信息较少，以及违约债信息披露缺失、不及时、不完整的问题也亟待解决。

　　二是资产证券化产品尚未实现穿透披露。近年来我国资产证券化（ABS）市场发行规模大幅增长，但二级市场流动性较低。其中一个主要原因就在于基础资产信息披露不穿透，标准化水平较低，披露格式（PDF格式）不便抓取，导致投资者难以进行精准估值和风险分析，从而制约了投资意愿。从国际经验来看，美国的资产证券化市场构建了较为成熟的穿透披露法规体系，通过上位法和规章条例明确要求对主要的六类ABS产品实行基础资产逐笔披露，并基本实现了穿透披露与隐私保护的平衡。

　　（四）相关配套制度有待完善

　　一是评级机制有待优化。客观公允的外部公开评级能够便利债券市场投资者按照风险偏好甄别、选取投资标的，提升市场运行效率。一直以来，我国债券市场评级机构由发行人选择，导致哪家评级机构评的级别高，发行人就选择哪家评级机构， 影响了债券评级的公正性、独立性。

　　二是现行税收制度制约国债的流动性。在发达金融市场中，国债具有无信用风险以及流动性最强两个特征，国债收益率曲线也因此成为金融市场的基准利率。而我国国债的流动性低于政策性银行债的流动性，税收因素可能是一大影响因素。我国对国债持有期间的利息收入免征所得税和增值税，而对国债买卖价差形成的资本利得则不免税。在这种制度下，为了获得最大税收节约效应，商业银行等金融机构主要出于配置目的大量投资国债并持有至到期，很少用于交易，从而影响了国债二级市场的活跃度和流动性。国际上，主要国家几乎都对国债利息收入和资本利得征税。其中，美国对国债利息收入和资本利得均征收联邦税，英国对居民企业投资者购买国债从双重不征税演变为双重征税。

　　三是资管产品的税收政策不统一。目前我国对公募基金的债券投资价差收入全部免税，而对银行理财管理人买卖债券获得的价差收入征收增值税和企业所得税。在此情况下，银行理财面临不同税负待遇，可能为降低交易成本、提高收益率而拉长投资期限，并倾向于通过定制一个公募基金或投资一个发起式基金来间接投资债券，从而实现避税。这也在一定程度上影响了债券市场的运行效率和活跃度。

　　推动债券市场更高质量发展的建议

　　立足新发展格局，应坚持制度自信，传承宝贵经验，解决现存问题，进一步提升市场效率，推动债券市场向更加规范、更加透明、更加安全、更可持续、更高质量的方向发展。

　　（一）完善发行机制，推动范式升级

　　一是推动实现发行DVP结算。目前，银行间债券市场已具备开展发行DVP结算的条件，中央结算公司具备系统功能，业务指引也已起草。建议监管部门批准并推动发行DVP机制落地，以提高债券发行效率与安全性。从二级市场DVP结算实践来看，其经历了从逐步试点到全面强制实施的过程。一级市场可在开展初期允许发行人自主选择DVP结算方式，待条件成熟时再全面推行。

　　二是将第三方估值作为发行定价的比较基准。经过长期培育发展，市场已推出了以中债估值为代表的全面反映人民币债券市场价格及风险状况的基准价格指标体系，市场机构广泛采用中债估值作为二级市场交易的公允价值计量基准和交易偏离监测基准。建议将第三方估值比对机制推广到一级市场，比如将中债各信用等级收益率曲线作为债券发行定价比较基准，以识别异常定价，提升发行效率。特别是部分机构认购结构化发行的信用债，容易扭曲债券定价，压低债券利率。建议通过第三方估值比对机制，及时识别机构自融行为，督促信息披露，解决违规自融和低效发行问题。

　　三是提高ISIN申请效率。为提高ISIN审核效率，充分发挥ISIN编码在债券全生命周期的作用，建议以系统对接方式提高申请效率，由ISIN编码分配管理部门为债券中央登记托管机构开立服务终端，并升级为接口级。 

　　四是适度扩大国债发行规模。国债是金融市场发展的基石，在维护金融市场稳定、支持宏观政策实施、提升市场定价效率等方面具有重要作用。国债也是境外投资者参与中国金融市场的首选投资标的，是金融开放以及人民币国际化的重要支点。随着中国金融改革开放的不断深化，市场对国债的需求与日俱增。目前中国债券市场的国债规模比重偏低，绝对规模和相对规模与发达国家成熟市场相比都有较大差距。建议适度扩大国债发行规模，以更好地满足宏观调控、流动性管理以及金融市场开放发展需要。

　　（二）完善交易机制，提高市场流动性

　　一是允许合格私募基金参与债券市场。建议适度降低机构投资者入市的注册资本金门槛，允许在中国证券投资基金业协会依法备案、通过托管行安排的私募基金进入银行间市场，并通过承销商（一级市场）、做市商（二级市场）进行交易，实现市场分层；同时，在中央登记托管机构直接开立债券账户，实现穿透监管。

　　二是激发市场主体交易动能。在国外成熟债券市场，做市商之间不能点击成交。做市商互相点击成交给其带来了报价风险，影响交易的积极性。为激发债券市场主体交易动能，建议明确做市商之间不能点击成交，需通过经纪人或自行协商成交；央行应成为“做市商的做市商”，助力市场流动性改善和做市商交易动能提升。

　　三是推动商业银行风险资本精准计提。建议参照贷款五级分类差异化风险计提的方式，对银行持有的其他金融机构和一般企业债权设置更加细分的风险权重。考虑到中债市场隐含评级是从市场价格信号和发行主体相关信息中提炼出的，能够动态反映市场投资者对债券的信用评价，可研究推行与中债市场隐含评级挂钩的差异化风险资本计提规则，通过高风险多计提、低风险少计提的方式，帮助银行节约资本。对于采用内部评级或评级公司评级设置风险权重的银行，建议采用中债市场隐含评级作为比较基准，提升资本管理的可比性和公允性。

　　四是弹性调整金融机构投资债券的评级标准。为提升金融机构参与债券市场的积极性，减少评级门槛“一刀切”的弊端，激发市场活力，建议对现有政策以及金融机构内部管理规定中的债券评级标准进行弹性调整。可考虑参考中债市场隐含评级，将对单只债券的评级约束调整为对所投资债券组合的评级约束，构建债券组合整体违约率的评分办法以及投资标准。

　　五是对境外商业机构逐步放开回购交易。建议对境外商业机构全面放开回购业务，可先放开逆回购，在控制杠杆的情况下放开正回购，以促进流动性提升，回应投资者关切。同时，逐步解决国际通用回购协议和国内回购主协议的等效性问题，允许境外机构投资者参与银行间债券市场回购时可自主选择签署回购交易主协议，例如国际通行的全球回购主协议（GMRA），便利其开展业务操作。在交易规则对接国际的同时，要将仲裁权和司法管辖权掌握在境内，以掌握对外开放的主动权。

　　六是有序推进国债期货。国债期货是利率风险对冲的重要工具，具有标准化、防范利率风险与流动性风险交叉传染等优势。商业银行持债规模较大，利率风险对冲需求强烈，参与国债期货市场有助于促进现货市场平稳运行，提高金融体系的抗风险能力。建议抓紧推动已获批银行国债期货业务落地，并适度扩大参与机构范围，允许承担做市商业务的商业银行参与国债期货，稳妥放开境外机构参与国债期货，促进风险管理和期货现货联动发展。

　　（三）发挥中央登记托管优势，支持多层次债券市场建设

　　一是坚持中央登记托管制度。坚持中央登记托管制度的核心是要坚持“中央确权”和“穿透监管”，并对贯彻不到位的情况予以完善。比如，包括理财产品在内的资管产品投资债券都应在中央登记托管机构独立开户，而非仅开立混同账户。如此既可发挥强穿透管理优势，防范挪用风险，又可提高结算效率，降低操作风险。对于境外投资者入市，如增加托管行模式，建议合理合规发挥托管行功能，在开立代理账户的同时，在总托管机构也为终端投资者单独开立债券托管账户，兼容穿透监管制度优势和境外多级服务需求。

　　二是由统一后台支持多元化前台。为满足多层次债券市场建设需要，应通过多元化交易前台满足市场的流动性需求，同时通过集中化、一体化的登记托管结算后台保证市场交易结算的安全性和效率。最简明高效的互联方案是统一互联，即由一个债券中央托管机构对接多个交易前台，其效率显著高于多个托管后台交叉开户的安排。如坚持实施托管后台交叉开户，则必须遵循穿透原则和主场结算原则，由总登记托管机构为终端投资者单独开立债券账户，并为投资者提供最终结算服务，以防范交叉开户的潜在风险。

　　具体可推动建设交易多平台、多窗口，包括银行间市场和交易所、银登中心和保交所、区域交易中心，以及柜台等多个层次，使其各有侧重，互为补充，适当竞争。同时，推动债券中央托管结算机构与多交易前台直联，以低成本高效地支持投资者跨市场交易。具体可借鉴2014年平安银行1号小额消费贷款资产支持证券的经验，先行实施中央结算公司与交易所前台直连，推动实现债券跨市场互联。此外，推动托管结算后台有机统筹整合，在专业分工的基础上，实现股债分开，中央托管机构和中央对手方职能分开。进一步可整合形成功能齐全、风控有力、治理完善、国际领先的国家金融基础设施集团。

　　（四）加强信息披露，提高穿透化标准化水平

　　一是推动公司信用类债券信息披露标准统一和数据共享。建议以实现存续期信息披露的“一次编辑、一次上传、多方共享、多平台披露”为最终目标分步推进。第一步，先在单个券种内实现，如实现企业债市场在中央结算公司、沪深交易所的标准统一和数据共享。第二步，实现企业债和非上市企业公司债的标准统一和数据共享。最后一步，推动实现企业债、公司债和债务融资工具等整个公司信用类债券市场的标准统一和数据共享。可考虑推动成立公司信用类债券信息披露标准委员会，所有平台共同参与制定信息披露行业标准，共商标准应用和更新事宜，确保标准同步更新和长期统一。在系统建设方面，短期建议将审核受理系统作为单个券种存续期信息披露系统，由受理审核机构将信息披露文件共享给其他披露平台。以企业债为例，发行人将可扩展商业报告语言（XBRL）格式信息披露文件上传给中央结算公司，中央结算公司根据跨市场情况同步推送至沪深交易所。中长期建议推动建立跨券种的共享信息披露机制，实现所有公司信用类债券发行人在一个信息披露系统上报送XBRL格式文件，系统根据发行人的发债类型和跨市场情况，自动将文件推送给其他信息披露平台。为进一步便利发行人参与，降低信息披露平台对纸质盖章页的依赖程度，建议共享信息披露系统可同时对发行人和主承销商开放，支持有能力、有意愿的发行人自主上传信息，以身份识别代替盖章等繁琐流程。主承销商可查阅发行人上传的文件，对文件内容和上传时效进行确认并承担连带责任。

　　二是完善私募债信息披露。为进一步提升私募债信息披露质量，建议在未来制定的公司债券管理条例等规则中推动私募债信息披露标准统一。具体包括：私募债发行主体应参照《公司信用类债券信息披露管理办法》的相关要求，及时披露发债企业最近三年经审计的财务报告及最近一期会计报表、募集说明书、信用评级报告等；参照《公司信用类债券信息披露管理办法》的相关要求，在债券存续期内按时披露定期报告；在私募债发行结束后及时披露发行结果公告，内容包括但不限于当期债券的计划发行总额、实际发行总额、发行利率、发行价格、投资申购家数、合规及有效申购家数、最高及最低申购利率等信息；发行人通过权威渠道以标准化形式披露信息，可使用Excel或参照XBRL格式，按照标准化、电子化格式，及时、全面地披露财务信息。

　　三是加强违约债信息披露。建议推动完善违约债信息披露。具体包括：加强债券发生违约的信息披露，发行人及中介机构应及时、准确地披露债券违约信息，特别是违约本息金额等重要信息；对于进入破产诉讼程序的违约债发行人，建议加强对重整计划、和解计划等重要文本的披露；对于依据重整计划将债券对应债权留债处置的，以及自筹资金或引入战略投资者偿付违约债的，应及时披露相关偿付、履约情况，在偿付完毕或未能履约时，应及时披露相关信息；加强对违约债发行人定期财务报告的信息披露。

　　四是推动ABS底层资产信息穿透式、标准化披露。我国银行间市场的信贷资产证券化起步较早，信息披露规则更加完善，产品特征与美国等成熟ABS市场最为接近，并且信息登记制实现了对基础资产的穿透登记，提升了底层数据的标准化水平，为推动基础资产信息逐笔披露创造了条件。建议推动信贷ABS产品入池资产重要信息的逐笔、标准化披露，为投资者和第三方估值机构提供充分的风险评估和决策参考，促进信息对称，激发市场活力。在法律层面，研究推动在资产证券化上位法中对信息穿透披露作出统领式规定，确立信息穿透披露的法律基础和监管依据，并解决与隐私保护相关的法律冲突问题。在制度层面，初期可对自愿逐笔披露的发起机构给予激励政策，比如放开发行规模限制、享受利率优惠等；待市场接受度提高后，再就各类产品的基础资产逐笔披露要求出台制度规范。在操作层面，中央结算公司联合多家专业机构，在对中美资产支持证券信息披露比较研究的基础上，起草了信贷ABS资产逐笔信息披露标准，充分考虑了好用性、便利性以及对底层资产借款人隐私的保护，成为业内共识。可参考该标准持续完善信息登记要素，提供数据查询服务，最终逐步推动实现公开披露。

　　（五）推动债市标准升级，健全行业标准体系

　　《国家标准化发展纲要》要求进一步加强标准化工作，充分释放市场主体标准化活力，大幅提升市场自主制定标准的比重。为深入贯彻《国家标准化发展纲要》精神，应加快构建专业精细的债券市场行业标准体系。我国债券市场40多年的发展实践取得了多项历史性突破，多项安排全球领先。对于在实践中已被反复验证先进合理、具有国际领先水平的标准应积极推动升级为行业标准。

　　建议推动“绿色债券环境效益信息披露指标体系”升级为行业标准，探索在粤港澳大湾区的试点应用并逐步推广，适时推动纳入相关国际标准议程；推动中债ESG评价体系成为债券市场ESG评价行业标准，鼓励债券市场ESG评价分析工具与数据库建设；以中央结算公司起草的“债券担保品管理技术指南”“债券发行招标与中标处理规范”“固定收益证券价格指标计算方法规范”“收益率曲线和债券估值编制规范”“固定收益证券登记要素”“固定收益证券本金偿付规范”等为基础，推动债券市场行业标准体系建设。

　　（六）深化债券收益率曲线应用，丰富政策工具

　　一是创新国债收益率曲线在债券市场的应用。建议创新、丰富以国债收益率为定价基准的金融产品，包括发行以短期国债收益率为定价基准的浮动利率国债、开发以国债收益率为标的的金融衍生品等。

　　二是推动扩大收益率曲线作为定价基准的应用范围。建议扩大国债收益率的定价基准范围，逐步覆盖其他债权、股权、衍生品等债券之外的金融资产，促进利率在整个金融市场中的有效传导。考虑到债券收益率期限结构完整且连续性强，可研究探索在贷款市场报价利率（LPR）基础上将国债、信用债等债券的收益率曲线也纳入贷款定价基准参考。

　　三是进一步扩大国债收益率在政策和市场中的应用。10年期国债收益率与潜在经济增长率之间的关系较为稳定，可将10年期国债收益率作为重要政策参考目标以及货币政策适度性的衡量指标。公开市场操作、国库现金管理以及市场交易中的债券回购、债券借贷均涉及担保品管理，建议基于国债收益率形成的估值，实施逐日盯市，充分发挥国债收益率曲线的基准作用。随着中国国债规模的扩大和国债流动性的改善，适时重启公开市场现券交易，有利于更好发挥国债收益率的定价基准作用，提高政策传导效率，改善国债市场的流动性。

　　（七）优化评级、税收机制，完善政策配套措施

　　一是探索“发行人付费、投资者选择”安排。为提高评级的公平性和独立性，当务之急是要将评级机构选择权交给投资人。而如采取投资者付费模式，将存在一定问题，主要包括：不同投资人购买不同评级机构产品将增加沟通障碍和交易成本；如购买评级的投资者较少，可能影响债券的流动性；发行人配合度较低，提供的信息可能存在不客观、不及时、不全面等问题；难以完全解决利益冲突问题，投资者和中介机构之间也可能存在利益关联。因此，建议探索实行“发行人付费、投资者投票选择”机制，即评级费用仍由发行人支付，但由投资者投票选择评级机构。这一方面可以通过制度切断发行人和评级机构之间的利益关联，缓解利益冲突，提高评级机构服务的客观中立性；另一方面也可利用传统的发行人付费模式的规模效应，提高债券市场运行效率。对于会计师事务所和律师事务所的选择，也可探索“发行人付费、投资者投票”的机制安排。

　　二是优化国债利息和资本利得税收安排。建议优化国债税收制度，对国债利息和资本利得均征税或均不征税，以提升市场主体交易的积极性，提高国债市场的流动性，消除由利息免税导致的定价扭曲效应，更好地发挥国债收益率曲线定价基准作用。

　　三是推动理财与公募基金税收政策统一。随着公募基金和银行理财在各项监管指标上逐渐拉平，建议推动银行理财可享受与公募基金同等的税收政策。

　　To Promote Institutional Construction and Enhance Bond Market Performance Quality

　　Feng Yuan， Li Bo

　　Abstract

　　The new phase of development places higher requirements for the bond market to serve the real economy， forestall and defuse financial risks and support financial reform and opening up． The bond market should be more efficient in promoting financing， investment， resource allocation， price discovery and policy transmission． From the perspective of market efficiency， this paper analyzes the good practices and existing problems in China’s bond market in terms of issuance， trading， registration， depository， information disclosure and industry standards， and provides suggestions for improvements at institutional and technical levels．

　　Keywords

　　Market efficiency， central registration and depository， standardization

　　China’s bond market has developed into the world’s second largest and an important part in the global financial market． China’s bond market mechanism has been world-leading in some areas， such as the transparent and efficient central registration and depository system， the delivery versus payment （DVP） settlement with the highest level of certainty and the increasingly mature yield curves． In the new stage of high-quality development， the bond market should fully harness its function in financing and investment， resource allocation， price discovery and policy transmission to better serve the development of the real economy and the reform and opening up of the financial sector． To fully harness its function， the market must run efficiently． In the future， valuable experience should be carried forward to remove the existing obstacles and improve market mechanisms relating to issuance， trading， registration， depository， information disclosure and industry standards． In this way， we will push market efficiency to a higher level and pursue high-quality development through efficient operation．

　　The bond market should move towards higher quality and efficiency

　　Since the resumption of the Chinese government bond （CGB） issuance in 1981， China’s bond market has made great achievements over the past four decades， such as stronger financial infrastructure， a wider range of bond varieties and greater diversity of market participants in an expanding market that is more active， more liquid and opening up at a faster pace．

　　In the context of China’s fast-growing national economy and ongoing financial reform and opening up in a world undergoing profound changes， the new phase of development places higher requirements for the bond market to serve the real economy， forestall and defuse financial risks and support financial reform and opening up． The bond market should fully harness its function in financing and investment， resource allocation， price discovery and policy transmission． How well the financial market functions depends on market efficiency． The higher the efficiency， the better the market functions． To get poised for new opportunities and meet new requirements in the new stage of development， therefore， the bond market should， while growing in size， go deeper in efforts to boost quality and efficiency． Market efficiency should be the focus of development and optimization in the new development stage．

　　Generally speaking， an efficient bond market should have the following characteristics： （1） swift and steady operation． The bond issuance and trading can be completed safely， timely and effectively in the shortest time and at the lowest cost， and the market is active and liquid with efficient and robust infrastructure； （2） transparent disclosure． The bond information can be disclosed in a timely， complete and accurate manner， with accessible digital carriers or formats； （3） standardized governance． The bond business is governed by unified regulatory norms and a full set of industry standards and guidelines， which ensure that the market environment is fair and just； and （4） unimpeded price transmission． The bond prices can price in macroeconomic changes in a timely manner to guide the allocation of financial resources．

　　Based on the above dimensions， therefore， we can summarize and carry forward the good practices and valuable experience gained in China’s bond market to solve the existing problems and obstacles， and to enhance market efficiency and safety．

　　China’s bond market achievements in efficiency enhancement

　　Thanks to the continuous improvement of the institutional system and the strong support from financial infrastructure， China has made remarkable achievements in its bond market， evidenced by a few globally leading arrangements and significantly enhanced efficiency．

　　i． Financial infrastructure support efficient and steady market operation

　　First， the DVP settlement mechanism ensures safe and efficient settlement．In 2004， the CCDC bond system was linked to the PBOC’s High Value Payment System （HVPS） to create a DVP mechanism featuring real-time gross settlement． At present， the inter-bank bond market has applied the DVP settlement mechanism to full scale in the secondary market， eliminating the principal risk． A strong guarantee is also provided for the payment system through automatic financing secured by bonds as collateral． This is one of the major indicators of China’s world-leading financial infrastructure．

　　Second， the central depository system has laid a solid foundation for an efficient bond market． Central depository service means that the central securities depository （CSD） functions as the central registry and central custodian of bonds in accordance with the law or upon authorization， thereby enabling the integration of central registration and central custody of bonds． Such integration enables the transfer， maintenance and management of bond entitlements through the CSD’s account system alone． Bond settlement and registration thereof occur simultaneously， ensuring clear legal relationships and transparency， as well as safety and efficiency． China’s bond market once experienced a bumpy road due to decentralized custody and registration． To eradicate the chaos， China established a central depository system for its bond market in the 1990s by adapting good international practices to its domestic reality． The system has become an important cornerstone for efficient and steady operation of the market for more than two decades． The CIBM Direct based on central depository is safe， efficient and transparent， and has become the main channel for foreign investors to access the Chinese bond market． The bond holdings of foreign institutions under CIBM Direct account for 75% of all foreign bond holdings in China．

　　At present， the settlement cycle in China’s bond market is shorter than that of many developed markets． Onshore settlement is mainly based on T+0， supplemented by T+1， with flexible settlement cycle arrangements （T+N） available for cross-border settlement． Under the CIBM Direct， most settlements are done on， with T+0 and T+1 settlements together accounting for 60% of total． Under the Bond Connect which is based on a multi-level account structure and indirect holding， the settlement cycle is significantly longer， with T+0 and T+1 together accounting for 38%， and T+0 alone taking up only 0.57%．

　　ii． The information disclosure mechanism kept improving

　　First， the information disclosure policies for corporate credit bonds are converging． In December 2020， PBOC， NDRC and CSRC jointly issued the Administrative Measures on Information Disclosure of Corporate Credit Bonds， unifying disclosure policies across the interbank market and the exchange． In August 2021， PBOC， NDRC， MOF， CBIRC， CSRC and SAFE issued the Guidance on Promoting High-quality Development in the Reform and Opening-up of the Corporate Credit Bond Market． The document established a principle of converging taxonomies． Specifically， the rules for corporate credit bonds of the same category will be gradually unified under the classification criteria for public offering versus non-public offering． The guidance underlines unification of the rules for corporate credit bonds offered in a non-public way in terms of issuance， transfer， information disclosure， investor protection and legal liabilities．

　　Second， breakthroughs have been made in the environmental impact disclosure of green bonds． Recent years have seen China’s green bond market thriving and lending a significant impetus to green development and low-carbon transition． To promote the environmental impact disclosure of green bonds， CCDC has created the Environmental Impact Disclosure Indicator System， which has got wide attention in the market and promises to be incorporated into the regional standards for Shenzhen’s green finance． CCDC has launched a web portal for green bond environmental impact disclosure and a green bond database． They allow users to search and download green bonds’ environmental impact data， the ChinaBond green bond indices and the green bond-related policy highlights and research findings． The unified environmental impact disclosure platform and database， based on digital technologies， can quantify the environmental contributions of bond proceeds in a comprehensive and systematic way， helping issuers boost the transparency of disclosures and prevent “greenwashing”， helping investors reduce screening costs and improve investment efficiency and helping government agencies better identify green bonds and assess policy effectiveness．

　　Third， the ESG evaluation system has been advanced． Pursuing sustainable development has become a global consensus． ESG evaluation， as a value concept and evaluation standard focusing on the sustainability of business operations， has received extensive attention from domestic and foreign investors， and is gradually gaining traction in China’s bond market． With the goals of carbon peak and carbon neutrality introduced， the attention and demand for the ESG philosophy and related products are increasing across China． CCDC has independently developed the ChinaBond ESG Evaluation System in line with the international mainstream methodologies and China’s market realities． The system has pooled non-structured data and alternative data using financial technologies． It is the first ESG evaluation system to achieve full coverage of publicly offered credit bond issuers in China’s bond market， covering over 8，000 bond market participants and listed companies． The ChinaBond ESG Evaluation consists of indicators for environmental performance （E）， social responsibility （S） and corporate governance （G）， which are further divided into 14 tier-two indicators， 39 tier-three indicators and more than 160 bottom-level indicators． The system， as the first of its kind in China’s bond market， plays a crucial role in the formation of the ESG evaluation and standards in China’s bond market， encouraging sustainable development of enterprises， improving the quality of ESG disclosure， protecting bond investors and promoting ESG practices．

　　iii． Release of two industry standards for bond pricing products

　　In a mature bond market， unified and fine-grained regulatory standards and business rules are an important foundation for efficient market operation． In China’s bond market overseen by a few regulatory authorities， the standardization of important business rules can not only bring discipline and higher efficiency to market operation， but also help improve the efficiency of supervision． Based on expertise as a financial market infrastructure for over 20 years， CCDC has established more than 10 standards for bond registration， valuation， collateral， etc． The Data Description Specification for Bond Pricing and Primary Data Collection Standards for Bond Pricing have passed the review of China Financial Standardization Technical Committee and been officially published as industry standards by PBOC in July 2021． The two sets standards have effectively heightened the status of bond pricing products as benchmarks with enhanced fairness and quality， bringing down the cost of pricing and promoting data sharing across the bond market．

　　iv． The bond yield curve system is becoming increasingly full-fledged

　　The government bond yield curve responds quickly to monetary policy， representing a country’s risk-free interest rate， and is an important benchmark for pricing analysis and risk management in financial markets． The Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee called for “improving the government bond yield curve showing the relationship between market supply and demand”． In 2020， the CPC Central Committee and the State Council issued the Guidelines on Improving the Market-based Allocation Mechanism of Production Factors and the Guidelines on Accelerating the Improvement of the Socialist Market Economy System in the New Era， further laying stress on “better unleashing the pricing benchmark role of the government bond yield curve”．

　　Since the first ever RMB CGB yield curve was released in 1999， the CGB yield curve has become increasingly mature． Since 2014， the MOF， PBOC and CBIRC have successively published the CGB yield curve produced by CCDC on their websites． The CGB yield curve is used by market institutions in a growing range of scenarios， including fair value measurement， transaction pricing and risk management， playing a vital role in the bond market． It is also used as the pricing benchmark for book-entry CGB and local government bond in issuance． In 2016， the three-month ChinaBond Government Bond Yield was included in the special drawing rights （SDR） interest rate basket to provide pricing reference for foreign central banks and commercial institutions investing in the Chinese bond market， effectively promoting the RMB internationalization． In addition， the CGB yield curve is also used in pricing of non-standard debt assets， such as banking wealth management， credit assets， trust products and insurance asset management products， and plays an increasingly important role in the funds transfer pricing （FTP） process of commercial banks．

　　At present， the ChinaBond yield curves cover the full spectrum of bonds and credit ratings in China’s bond market． The yield curves of policy bank bonds and credit bonds also contribute to the development of financial markets and he transmission of monetary policies． As for the yield curve of policy bank bonds，China Development Bank （CDB）， the Agricultural Development Bank of China （ADBC） and the Export-Import Bank of China （CEXIM） display the ChinaBond CDB Bond Yield Curve， the ChinaBond ADBC Bond Yield Curve and the ChinaBond CEXIM Bond Yield Curve on their respective websites， which are important pricing benchmarks for issuance and trading of policy bank bonds． The ChinaBond CDB Bond Yield Curve has become the benchmark rate for some floating-rate bonds． The ChinaBond CEXIM Bond Yield Curve has been taken by CEXIM as the benchmark rate for perpetual capital bonds． The valuations of CDB bonds and ADBC bonds calculated based on the ChinaBond CDB Bond Yield Curve and the ChinaBond ADBC Bond Yield Curve have become the pricing benchmark for standard bond forward contracts． As for credit bond yield curves， the PBOC and the CBIRC released the ChinaBond Financial Bond of Commercial Bank Yield Curve and the ChinaBond CP&Note Yield Curve on their respective websites． The credit bond yield curves can timely and accurately reflect the changes in the bond market， providing important reference for observing the monetary policy transmission to the real economy， predicting macroeconomic trends and formulating macroeconomic policies．

　　Bond market efficiency still has room for improvement

　　China’s bond market has entered a new stage of development． In order to improve the market efficiency in an all-round way， some problems and challenges should be addressed， and the market mechanism must be further improved．

　　i． The issuance and trading mechanism needs to be improved

　　First， DVP settlement has not been fully implemented in issuance． In 2001， the Bank for International Settlements （BIS） and the International Organization for Securities and Futures Commissions （IOSCO） issued the Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems （RSSS）， stating that DVP could and should be achieved for issuance and redemption of securities as well as for transactions in secondary markets． DVP has been fully achieved for trading in China’s inter-bank bond market， but it has not been designated as a standard method for payment for subscription in the primary market． The ownership confirmation and listing of bonds do not coincide with delivery of funds， which affects the efficiency and poses some default risk．

　　Second， it takes a long time to apply for the International Securities Identification Number （ISIN）． ISIN is a securities coding standard formulated by the International Organization for Standardization． In the bond market， ISIN providers unique identifiers for cross-venue bonds， and is also an important tool for foreign investors to identify China’s bonds． It is crucial to the opening-up of China’s bond market． At present， the ISIN application process in China’s bond market is relatively prolonged． The approval date of most bonds come later than the value date or listing date．

　　Third， private funds have a low share in the bond market． China is making coordinated efforts to build a multi-level bond market and encouraging innovative instruments such as high-yield bonds． Thus it is necessary to further diversify the risk appetites of investors and give additional boost to market innovation． Data shows that as of the end of 2021， there were 24，610 outstanding private equity fund managers registered with the Asset Management Association of China （AMAC）． However， there were only 404 private funds in the inter-bank bond market， indicating limited participation by private funds in the bond market．

　　Fourth， there are rating restrictions for financial institutions to invest in bonds． According to the current policies and the internal management mechanisms， financial institutions can only invest in bonds with certain ratings． The rating requirements are for individual bonds rather than a portfolio， which throttle the market vitality to a certain extent， and may also lead to inflated ratings．

　　Fifth， the risk allowances for banks’ bond holding have yet to be improved．Either asset or liability side of banking institutions’ balance sheet has registered over RMB100 trillion in bonds in aggregate． In accordance with the Capital Rules for Commercial Banks （Provisional）， the risk weight of commercial banks’ claims on other financial institutions and general corporates is 100%， compared with a risk weight of 25% for claims on other commercial banks and 75% for claims on eligible micro and small enterprises， which is not conducive to differentiated management of risks．

　　Sixth， repurchase is not fully available to foreign investors． Repurchase is a basic tool for investors to manage their liquidity． For foreign investors， only foreign central bank， RMB participants and clearing banks are allowed to conduct repurchases in the interbank bond market． In fact， foreign asset managers that value the efficiency of funds and assets have stronger demand for repurchases． In addition， operationally， foreign institutions have to sign the master repurchase agreement published by the National Association of Financial Market Institutional Investors （NAFMII）， instead of the globally used GMRA， to engage in repurchase in China， which discourages participation．

　　Seventh， the number and types of institutions participating in the CGB futures market are limited． At present， the participants in China’s CGB futures market are limited in number and types． Approved participants are only the five major state-owned commercial banks， subject to window restrictions． Most commercial banks’ interest rate risk hedging instruments are still interest rate swaps and bond forwards， lacking standardized instruments． In addition， CGB futures are not available to foreign investors to meet their needs for standardized interest rate risk hedging． This not only affects foreign investors’ enthusiasm for the Chinese bond market， but also results in foreign investors having to manage their exposure by selling spot bonds， which brings certain risk in cross-border capital flows．

　　ii． Coordinated efforts needed to optimize the financial infrastructure

　　First， there are potential risks in the opaque multi-level depository model．The central depository-based settlement system was designed based on lessons learnt and experience gained by China in its bond market development， and on the wisdoms of regulatory authorities． It has proved to be effective， safe and efficient． It should be implemented unswervingly． However， there are still some ambiguities in understanding． For example， some argue that wealth management products can be managed in a multi-level depository model with omnibus accounts， which in fact poses serious systemic risks． In addition， when foreign investors indirectly enter the market through omnibus accounts， it is difficult to guarantee the authenticity， integrity and timeliness of information， and it is difficult to for regulators to see through．

　　Second， registration and depository institutions are fragmented． A common global practice is to support diverse trading venues with a single back office． The general trend for depository and settlement institutions is centralization， which ensures order among multiple front offices． Markets around the world have sought to consolidate their depository and settlement back-offices to boost free flow of market factors， reduce trading costs and raise market efficiency． Also， in order to meet complex and diversified trading needs， the front offices become diversified based on full competition． The registration， depository and settlement infrastructures in China’s bond market were once unified to address irregularities， but in recent years have gone fragmented to a certain extent． At present， the three registration， depository and settlement institutions in the bond market provide services for different types of bonds and markets separately， resulting in duplication of costs． The situation increases the communication costs between institutions， intensifies market fragmentation and hinders safety and efficiency． Now most markets have set up a single depository and settlement institution； only China and India each have in place three． Also， China’s bond market see front offices relatively concentrated． In particular， front offices in the over-the-counter market are under-developed and small in number． This is not in line with international practices and makes it hard to meet the multi-level needs of various participants．

　　Third， the CSD is not independent from the central counterparty （CCP）． The CSD and the CCP take different risks and are legal entities independent from each other in most markets around the world． However， in China， the CSD and the CCP are not segregated in some financial infrastructure．

　　iii． Information disclosure should be further standardized and more transparent

　　First， information disclosure standards should be unified for corporate credit bonds． There are many kinds of corporate credit bonds in China， which are traded in the inter-bank market and on exchanges． The information disclosure standards tend to be uniform， but still show some inconsistencies． To ease the operational burden on market entities， simplify internal processes， boost the efficiency of disclosure and reduce the operational risk， it is necessary to unify the disclosure standards and promote data sharing of corporate credit bonds． What should be addressed urgently also include a low disclosure level of private placed bonds and the lack， delay or incompleteness of disclosure on defaulted bonds．

　　Second， see-through disclosure has not been realized for ABS． In recent years， China’s ABS market has expanded substantially in issuance scale， but the secondary market is low in liquidity． One of the main reasons goes to the lack of see-through disclosure of underlying assets， low level of standardization and difficulty in information capturing （as disclosures are often made in PDF）． These problems prevent investors from precise valuation and risk analysis， becoming a major constraint on their desire to invest． From the perspective of international experience， the US ABS market has a well-established legal and regulatory framework for see-through disclosure， requiring asset-level disclosure of the six major categories of ABS products， while keeping a balance between see-through disclosure and privacy protection．

　　iv． Supporting systems can be improved

　　First， the rating mechanism needs to be refined． Impartial and fair external public ratings help investors identify and select investment targets suitable for their risk appetite， thus improving market efficiency． For a long time， rating agencies are chosen by issuers in China’s bond market． Issuers go for rating agencies that give higher ratings， undermining the impartiality and independence of bond ratings．

　　Second， the current tax regime restricts the liquidity of CGB． In developed financial markets， government bonds have no credit risk and the strongest liquidity， and， therefore， the government bond yield curve is the benchmark rate． In China， however， CGBs are less liquid than policy bank bonds， where the tax arrangements may be a major factor． In China， the interest income on CGB is exempted from income tax and value-added tax， but the capital gains from the bid-ask spreads are not tax-exempt． Under this regime， to obtain the maximum tax saving effect， commercial banks and other financial institutions tend to hold massive amounts of CGBs to maturity， instead of trading them， thus restricting the liquidity of CGBs． Major markets around the world do levy taxes on the interest income and capital gains on government bonds． The US levy federal tax on both interests and capital gains on Treasury bonds， while the UK changed from double non-taxation to double taxation on the purchase of government bonds by resident corporate investors．

　　Third， the tax policies for asset management products are inconsistent． At present， the income from the spreads on bonds is exempted from tax for public offered funds， but is subject to value-added tax and corporate income tax for bank wealth management products． Therefore， to reduce costs and raise returns， the bank wealth managers tend to lengthen the investment term， and invest in bonds indirectly through a tailor-made public offered fund or investing in a sponsored fund for tax evasion purposes． This dampens the efficiency and activity of the bond market to some extent．

　　Suggestions on promoting higher-quality development of the bond market

　　Under the new development pattern， we should stay confident in the system and carry forward valuable legacy to solve the existing problems， and to pursue a better future of the bond market with a higher level of efficiency， standardization， transparency， safety， sustainability and quality．

　　i． Improve the issuance mechanism and upgrade the paradigm

　　First， DVP should be used in bond issuance． At present， the inter-bank bond market is well-equipped for DVP settlement in issuance． CCDC has the technical system as well as drafted business guidelines in place． It is suggested that the regulatory authorities approve and promote the use of DVP in issuance， so as to raise security and efficiency． DVP practices in the secondary market have experienced a transition from pilot implementation to full-scale mandatory use． The primary market may allow the issuers to choose DVP at their discretion in the early stage， and then implement the mechanism market-wide when conditions permit．

　　Second， third-party valuation should be used as the benchmark for issue pricing． After cultivation and development over a long period of time， the market has had a set of benchmark price indicators that provide a full picture of the market price and risk status of RMB bonds， represented by ChinaBond Valuation． Market entities have adopted ChinaBond Valuation as the benchmark for fair value measurement and for monitoring deviation of transaction prices in the secondary market． It is suggested that the third-party valuation comparison mechanism be extended to the primary market． For example， the ChinaBond yield curve for each credit rating can be used as the benchmark for bond issue pricing to detect abnormal pricing and raise issuance efficiency． In particular， some institutions subscribe for credit bonds issued in a structured fashion， which tends to distort bond pricing and depress yields． It is suggested that the third-party valuation comparison mechanism be used to detect self-financing promptly， urge information disclosure and address the problem of self-financing and issuance inefficiency．

　　Third， the application process for ISIN should be more efficient． To improve the efficiency of ISIN application and give full play to the role of ISIN through the lifecycle of the bonds， it is proposed to improve the application efficiency by means of system interfacing． The ISIN allocation manager may open a service terminal for the CSD and upgrade it to the interface level．  

　　Fourth， the size of CGB issuance should be expanded moderately． CGB is the cornerstone of China’s financial market development， playing a central role in maintaining financial market stability， supporting the implementation of macro policies and boosting the efficiency of market pricing． CGB is also the preferred target for foreign investors seeking an exposure to China’s financial market， and an anchor for financial openness and RMB internationalization． The market demand for CGB keeps expanding as China is going deeper in its financial reform and opening up． At present， CGB represents a relatively small share in China’s bond market， showing a big gap with developed markets in either value or share． It is suggested to expand the CGB issuance scale moderately to better meet the needs of macro-control， liquidity management and the opening-up and development of the financial market．

　　ii． Improve the trading mechanism and enhance the market liquidity

　　First， qualified private placed funds should be allowed to access the bond market． It is suggested to lower the registered capital threshold for institutional investors to enter the market， to allow private placed funds registered with the AMAC to access the interbank market through a custodian bank and trade through underwriters （primary market） and market makers （secondary market） to form a tiered market． In addition， they should be allowed to open bond accounts directly with the CSD to enable see-through supervision．

　　Second， market entities should be encouraged to trade． In mature bond markets， the click-to-trade model is prohibited between market makers． Market makers clicking on each other to clinch a deal will bring them a quotation risk， discouraging trading． For bond market participants to be motivated to trade， it is suggested to explicitly ban click-to-trade deals between market makers and require them to trade via brokers or directly through negotiation． The central bank should become a “market maker for market makers” to help improve liquidity and motivate market makers to trade．

　　Third， risk provisions for commercial banks should be improved． It is suggested to increase the granularity of risk weights for banks’ claims on other financial institutions and general corporates with reference to the risk provision differentiation based on five-category loan classification． Since the ChinaBond Market-Implied Ratings （MIR） is a credit rating derived from market price signals and issuer information to dynamically reflect investors’ evaluation of bond creditworthiness， it is suggested to make differentiated risk provision rules linked to the ChinaBond MIR， thus helping banks save capital by aligning capital provision with risk level． For banks that use internal ratings or third-party ratings to set risk weights， it is suggested to use ChinaBond MIR as a benchmark to enhance the comparability and fairness of capital management．

　　Fourth， the rating criteria should be flexibly adjusted for financial institutions’ bond investment． To encourage financial institutions to participate in the bond market， reduce the adverse effect of “one size fits all” rating requirements and unleash market vitality， it is suggested to flexibly adjust the bond rating criteria set forth in the existing policies and financial institutions’ internal rules． With reference to the ChinaBond MIR， the target of rating constraints should turn from individual bonds to bond portfolios， so as to develop the assessment method and investment criteria based on the portfolio-wide default rate．

　　Fifth， the repurchase should become available to foreign commercial institutions in a well-paced manner． It is suggested to make the repurchase available to foreign commercial institutions step by step， starting with the reverse repurchase， and then for the repurchase at controlled leverage． In addition， efforts should be made to gradually address the equivalence between generally accepted international repurchase agreements， such as the GMRA， and China’s master repurchase agreements． Foreign institutional investors should be allowed to choose to which master repurchase agreement to use， so as to facilitate business operations． While adapting trading rules to international practices， the court and arbitral tribunal of competent jurisdiction should stay onshore China．

　　Sixth， CGB futures should be promoted in a well-ordered manner． CGB futures are an important instrument for hedging interest rate risk， featuring standardization and effectiveness in forestalling interaction between interest rate risk and liquidity risk． Commercial banks have large bond holdings and strong demand for hedging interest rate risk． Their participation in the CGB futures market will help stabilize the spot market and make the financial system more resilient to risks． It is suggested to implement the CGB futures business quickly among approved banks， expand the scope of participants properly， allow market makers to participate in CGB futures， prudently open the CGB futures to foreign institutions and promote risk management．

　　iii． Leveraging central depository service to support a multi-level bond market

　　First， the central depository should be upheld． At the core of upholding the central depository is staying true to “central confirmation of ownership” and “see-through supervision”， and making improvements where inadequacies in implementation are seen． For example， the asset management products （including wealth management products） that invest in bonds should open separate accounts with the CSD， rather than using an omnibus account． This approach prevents the risk of misappropriation through see-through supervision while boosting settlement efficiency and lowering operational risks． For overseas investors entering the market via a custodian bank， it is suggested that in addition to the agent account， a separate account for the end investor be opened with the CSD， thus enabling see-through supervision while ensuring services for overseas investors．

　　Second， a single back office should be in place to support diversified front offices． In order to build a multi-level bond market， the liquidity needs should be met with diversified front offices for trading， and the safety and efficiency of settlement should be ensured with a centralized and integrated back office． The best solution is central interconnection． Namely， a CSD connects several front offices， which is significantly more efficient than the arrangements for cross-opening of accounts between multiple depositories． If the latter persists， we must follow the principles of see-through supervision and settlement at a primary venue． The CSD opens separate bond accounts and provide final settlement services for end investors， so as to prevent the potential risk arising from cross-opening of accounts．

　　Specifically， it is suggested to establish a multi-platform and multi-window trading system divided into multiple tiers， including inter-bank market and exchanges， CCRE and SHIE， regional trading centers and bank counters， so that they focus on different areas while supplementing and competing with each other appropriately． Meanwhile， the CSD should create a direct link with front offices to support cross-market transactions in a cost-effective manner． Drawing upon the experience gained in Ping An Bank No． 1 Micro Consumer Loan ABS in 2014， it is suggested to start with a direct link between CCDC and the exchange to try and pursue cross-market connectivity． In addition， the back offices should be integrated to separate bonds from stocks， and CSD functions from CCP functions． Further integration can be made to form a nation-wide financial infrastructure layout with complete functions， strong risk control， sound governance and global leadership．

　　iv． Strengthen information disclosure and enhance the standardization and see-through supervision

　　First， it is necessary to unify disclosure standards and data sharing for corporate credit bonds． A stepwise approach is recommended toward the ultimate goal of ongoing disclosure featuring “one-time edit and upload for multi-party sharing and multi-platform disclosure”． The first step is to achieve the objective for individual types of bonds， such as the enterprise bond standardization and data sharing between CCDC， SSE and SZSE． The second step is to achieve the standardization and data sharing for enterprise bonds and unlisted corporate bonds． The last step is to promote the standardization and data sharing for the entire universe of corporate credit bonds， including enterprise bonds， corporate bonds and debt financing instruments． Consideration should be given to setting up a disclosure standards committee for corporate credit bonds， so that all platforms can participate in the making of standards and discuss the application and updating of standards， so as to ensure that the standards are updated synchronously and unified over the long term． As for system development， it is suggested that， in the near term， the acceptance and examination system be used as the disclosure system for individual types of bonds， so that the acceptance and examination agency can share the disclosure with other disclosure platforms． Take enterprise bonds for example， after the issuer uploads the disclosure documents in the XBRL format to CCDC， CCDC may simultaneously share them with SSE and SZSE． In the medium and long terms， it is suggested to establish a shared disclosure mechanism for various types of bonds， so as to enable all issuers of corporate credit bonds to submit XBRL-formatted documents via one disclosure system， which automatically forwards the documents to other disclosure platforms based on the bond type and cross-market status． To further facilitate the issuer and reduce disclosure platforms’ reliance on paper documents with seals and stamps， it is suggested that the shared disclosure system be open to the issuers and the lead underwriters， and allow capable issuers to upload information by themselves with a proper identity verification process． The lead underwriter should be allowed to view the documents uploaded by the issuer， confirm the contents of the documents and the timeliness of uploading and assume joint and several responsibilities．

　　Second， information disclosure should be improved for private placed bonds． To further improve the quality of private placed bond disclosures， it is suggested to promote the unification of disclosure standards in the future rules and regulations on corporate bonds． More specifically： The issuer should， with reference to the Administrative Measures on Information Disclosure of Corporate Credit Bonds， disclose in a timely manner the issuer’s audited financial reports for the last three years and the latest accounting statements， prospectus and credit rating report． The issuer should make timely ongoing disclosure with reference to the Administrative Measures on Information Disclosure of Corporate Credit Bonds． After the issuance of private placed bonds， the announcement of issuance results should be disclosed promptly， including but not limited to planned proceeds， actual proceeds， coupon rate， issuance price， number of subscribers， number of compliant and effective subscribers， and the highest and lowest subscription rate． The issuer should make disclosures in a standardized form through a trusted channel， and may disclose the financial information in a timely and comprehensive manner in an Excel/XBRL-based standard and electronic format．

　　Third， information disclosure should be enhanced for defaulted bonds． It is suggested to improve the information disclosure of defaulted bonds． More specifically： Information disclosure should be enhanced for bond defaults， and the issuers and intermediaries should provide timely and accurate information related to the defaults， especially the amounts of principal and interest involved． If the defaulting issuer has entered bankruptcy proceedings， it is suggested to require the disclosure of important documents such as reorganization plan and settlement plan． If the debts corresponding to bonds are rescheduled pursuant to the reorganization plan or the defaulted bonds are paid off with self-raised funds or by the introduction of strategic investor， the relevant debt service and contract fulfillment should be disclosed in a timely manner and， if the debt service is complete or the contract is not fulfilled， relevant information should be disclosed． The disclosure of defaulting issuers’ regular financial reports should be enhanced．

　　Fourth， standard asset-level disclosure should be promoted for ABS． China’s interbank market is an early mover in credit ABS， showing well-established disclosure rules and closest product features to those in mature ABS markets such as the US． Moreover， the information registration system enables look-through into underlying assets， thus improving the standardization of underlying data and setting stage for asset-level disclosure． It is suggested to promote standard disclosure of important information about individual assets underlying the ABS， thereby helping investors and third-party valuation agencies conduct risk assessment and make decisions on a well-informed basis， boosting information symmetry and vitalizing the market． At the legislative level， research is suggested to have the governing law for ABS set forth overarching rules governing the look-through disclosure of underlying assets， thus establishing the legislative and regulatory basis for look-through disclosure and addressing the conflict of laws on privacy protection． At the policy level， preferential policies （e.g． lifting restrictions on issue size and granting interest rate discounts） can be introduced in the early stage in favor of originators who voluntarily disclose information on individual underlying assets． With market acceptance increased， policies can be introduced for asset-level disclosure of products of various types． At the operational level， CCDC， based on the comparative study on ABS disclosure between China and the US， drafted the standards for asset-level disclosure of credit ABS jointly with several professional agencies． The standards take into full account the user-friendliness， convenience and privacy protection of underlying borrowers， which is an industry-wise consensus． The standards can be used as a reference to improve information registration， provide data query services and eventually achieve full disclosure．

　　v． Upgrade bond market standards and improve the industry-wide standards system

　　The National Standardization Development Outline calls for further strengthening standardization， vitalizing market participants and increasing the proportion of standards formulated by market participants． In this context， we should step up the efforts to build a system of professional and fine-grained industry standards for the bond market． China has achieved many historic breakthroughs in its bond market over the past four decades， boasting global leadership in many market arrangements． The standards that have repeatedly proved to be advanced， effective and globally leading should be upgraded to industry standards．

　　It is suggested to upgrade the ChinaBond Green Bond Environmental Impact Disclosure Indicator System to an industry standard， explore its pilot use in the Greater Bay Area and then scale-up and promote its inclusion into the relevant international agenda in due course． The ChinaBond ESG Evaluation System can be an industry standard for the bond market， and efforts should be encouraged to develop ESG evaluation and analysis tools and database． A system of bond market industry standards can be built based on the following CCDC documents： the Technical Guide for the Management of Bond Collateral， the Standard for Bidding and Awarding for Bond Issuance， the Standard for Calculation Methodology for Pricing Indicators of Fixed Income Securities， the Standard for Compiling the Yield Curves and Bond Valuations， the Elements for Registration of Fixed Income Securities and the Standard for Repayment of Principal of Fixed Income Securities．

　　vi． Deepen the application of bond yield curves and enrich the policy toolkit

　　First， new ways of using the CGB yield curve should be developed． It is suggested to innovate and enrich financial products that use the CGB yield as benchmark， including issuing floating-rate government bonds based on short-term CGB yields and developing derivatives underlain by CGB yields．

　　Second， efforts can be made to use the yield curve as a pricing benchmark on a broader scale． It is suggested to expand the use of CGB yields as a pricing benchmark to non-bond financial assets， including debt， equity and derivatives， so as to promote the effective transmission of interest rates across the entire financial market． Given the complete and continuous term structure of bond yields， it is suggested to incorporate the yield curves of bonds， such as CGBs and credit bonds， into the loan pricing references in addition to the loan prime rate （LPR）．

　　Third， the use of CGB yield in policy and market can be scaled up． The correlation between the 10-year CGB yield and the potential economic growth rate is relatively stable． Thus the 10-year CGB yield can be used as an important policy reference target and a measure of the appropriateness of monetary policy． As collateral is used in open market operations， Treasury cash management as well as bond repurchases and bond lending， it is suggested to use a mark-to-market approach based on the valuation derived from CGB yields， so as to fully harness the CGB yield curve as a benchmark． With CGBs expanding in scale and improving in liquidity， the resumption of spot bond trading in the open market will help better harness the CGB yield as pricing benchmark， boost the efficiency of policy transmission and improve the liquidity of the CGB market．

　　vii． Refine the rating and taxation mechanisms

　　First， to explore the “issuer pays， investors choose” arrangements． To improve the fairness and independence of ratings， it is imperative to give investors the freedom to choose rating agencies． However， if we adopt the “investor pays” model， there will be some problems， mainly including the following： The use of different rating agencies by different investors will add to the communication barriers and trading costs； if only a few investors purchase the rating service， the liquidity of bonds may be affected； the issuer may not be cooperative enough， and may provide information that is not objective， timely or comprehensive； it is difficult to avoid the conflicts of interest， and investors and intermediaries may have an interest in each other． Therefore， it is suggested to explore the “issuer pays， investors vote” mechanism， that is， the rating service is still paid by the issuer， but the investors vote to choose the rating agency． On the one hand， this mechanism can cut off the link of interests between the issuer and the rating agency， ease the conflict of interests and improve the impartiality and neutrality of the rating agency’s service． On the other hand， the “issuer pays” model will bring its economies of scale into full play and improve the operating efficiency in the bond market． We can also explore the “issuer pays， investors vote” mechanism for choosing accounting firms and law firms．

　　Second， the tax arrangements for CGB interest income and capital gains should be improved． It is suggested to levy taxes on both interest income and capital gains from CGB， or on neither of them， to encourage trading and raise liquidity in the CGB market， eliminate the pricing distortion caused by exemption of interest income and better harness the CGB yield curve as pricing benchmark．

　　Third， the tax policies should be unified for wealth management and public offered funds． As the regulatory indicators for public offered funds and bank wealth management products are increasingly aligned， it is suggested to apply the same tax policies．

　　The English version is for reference only． In case of any inconsistencies， the original Chinese version shall prevail．

　　Author from： Research and Development Center， CCDC

　　Editors in charge： Lu Ningning， Yin Ying

　　This article was first published on Bond Monthly （Apr.2022）． Please indicate the source clearly when citing this article． The English version is for reference only， and the original Chinese version shall prevail in case of any inconsistency．

　　◇ 本文原载《债券》2022年4月刊

　　◇ 作者：中央结算公司中债研发中心　冯源　李波

　　◇ 责任编辑：鹿宁宁　印颖